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Abstract 
 
The Panic of 2007-2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the “repo” market), 
which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of 
securitization activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, 
frequently with securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo 
finance as “securitized banking”, and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the 
crisis. We use a novel data set that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized 
bonds to trace the path of crisis from subprime-housing related assets into markets that 
had no connection to housing. We find that changes in the “LIB-OIS” spread, a proxy for 
counterparty risk, was strongly correlated with changes in credit spreads and repo rates 
for securitized bonds.  These changes implied higher uncertainty about bank solvency 
and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the 
bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo “haircuts”: the amount of collateral 
required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, 
the U.S. banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great 
Depression. 
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The current financial crisis is a system-wide bank run.  What makes this bank run 
special is that it did not occur in the traditional-banking system, but instead took place in 
the “securitized-banking” system.  A traditional-banking run is driven by the withdrawal 
of deposits, while a securitized-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of repurchase 
(“repo”) agreements.  Hence, we describe the crisis as a “run on repo”.  The purpose of 
this paper is to propose a mechanism for this new kind of bank run, and to provide 
supporting evidence for this mechanism through analysis of a novel data set.  
Traditional banking is the business of making and holding loans, with insured 
demand deposits as the main source of funds. Securitized banking is the business of 
packaging and reselling loans, with repo agreements as the main source of funds. 
Securitized-banking activities were central to the operations of firms formerly known as 
“investment banks” (e.g. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Merrill 
Lynch), but they also play a role at commercial banks, as a supplement to traditional-
banking activities of firms like Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and Bank of America.1 
We argue that the financial crisis that began in August 2007 is a “systemic event,” 
defined in this paper to mean that the banking sector became insolvent.  What happened 
is analogous to the banking panics of the 19th century in which depositors en masse went 
to their banks seeking to withdraw cash in exchange of demand and savings deposits.  
The banking system could not honor these demands because the cash had been lent out 
and the loans were illiquid, so instead they suspended convertibility and relied on 
clearinghouses to issue certificates as makeshift currency.2 Evidence of the insolvency of 
the banking system in these earlier episodes is the discount on these certificates.  We 
argue that the current crisis is similar in that contagion led to “withdrawals” in the form 
of unprecedented high repo haircuts and even the cessation of repo lending on many 
forms of collateral. Evidence of insolvency in 2008 is the bankruptcy or forced rescue of                                                         
1 We have chosen a new term, “securitized banking”, to emphasize the role of the securitization process 
both as the main intermediation activity and as a crucial source of the collateral used to raise funds in repo 
transactions.  Other banking terms – “wholesale banking”, “shadow banking”, or “investment banking” – 
have broader connotations and do not completely encompass our definition of securitized banking.  The 
closest notion to our definition of securitized banking is the model of “unstable banking” proposed by 
Shleifer and Vishny (2009). 
2 The clearinghouse private money was a claim on the coalition of banks, rather than a liability of any 
individual bank.  By broadening the backing for the claim, the clearinghouse made the claim safer, a kind 
of insurance. Gorton (1985) and Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) discuss the clearinghouse response to 
panics.  Also, see Gorton and Huang (2006). 
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several large firms, with other (even larger) firms requiring government support to stay in 
business. 
To perform our analysis, we use a novel data set with information on 392 securitized 
bonds and related assets, including many classes of asset-backed securities (ABS), 
collateralized-debt obligations (CDOs), credit-default swaps (CDS), repo rates, and repo 
haircuts.3  Using these data, we are able to provide a new perspective on the contagion in 
this crisis. In our exposition, we use this term “contagion” specifically to mean the spread 
of the crisis from subprime-housing assets to non-subprime assets that have no direct 
connection to the housing market.   
To provide background for our analysis, we illustrate the differences between 
traditional banking and securitized banking in Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 provides the 
classic picture of the financial intermediation of mortgages by the traditional-banking 
system.  In Step A, depositors transfer money to the bank, in return for a checking or 
savings account that can be withdrawn at any time.  In Step B, the bank loans these funds 
to a borrower, who promises to repay through a mortgage on the property. The bank then 
holds this mortgage on its balance sheet, along with other non-mortgage loans made to 
retail and commercial borrowers.   
Traditional-banking runs were ended in United States in the 1930s with the 
introduction of deposit insurance and discount-window lending by the Federal Reserve.  
With deposits insured by the federal government, depositors have little incentive to 
withdraw their funds. Deposit insurance works well for retail investors, but still leaves a 
challenge for large institutions. When deposit insurance was capped at $100,000, 
institutions such as sovereign-wealth funds, mutual funds, and cash-rich companies did 
not have easy access to safe short-term investments.  One solution to this problem is the 
securitized-banking system illustrated in Figure 2, which takes large “deposits” from 
investors (Step 1), and then intermediates these deposits to mortgage borrowers (Steps 2 
and 3) and other debtors.   
Step 1 in Figure 2 is an analogue to Step A from Figure 1, but there is one important 
difference.  In the traditional-banking system shown in Figure 1, the deposits are insured                                                         
3 This paper uses many terms and abbreviations that are atypical or new to the academic literature. 
Beginning in Section I, the first appearance of these terms is given in bold type, and definitions of bolded 
terms are given in Appendix A.   
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by the government. To achieve similar protection in Step 1 of Figure 2, the investor 
receives collateral from the bank.  In practice, this deposit-collateral transaction takes the 
form of a repo agreement: the investor buys some asset (=collateral) from the bank for 
$X, and the bank agrees to repurchase the same asset some time later (perhaps the next 
day) for $Y.  The percentage (Y-X)/X is the “repo rate”, and is analogous to the interest 
rate on a bank deposit.  Typically, the total amount of the deposit will be some amount 
less than the value of the underlying asset, with the difference called a “haircut”.  For 
example, if an asset has a market value of $100 and a bank sells it for $80 with an 
agreement to repurchase it for $88, then we would say that the repo rate is 10 percent (= 
88-80 / 80), and the haircut is 20 percent (100 – 80 / 100).  If the bank defaults on the 
promise to repurchase, then the investor keeps the collateral.  
Turning next to the lower right corner of Figure 2, we show how the second part of 
the intermediation differs from traditional banking.  In Figure 1, the bank did the work of 
underwriting the loan itself.  In Figure 2, the bank outsources this function to a direct 
lender. Such lenders grew to prominence in the most recent housing boom, with a 
specialization of underwriting loans to be held for only a short time before being sold to 
banks. Much has been written about potential conflicts in this separation of the loan 
decision from the source of finance, but that is not our topic here.  In principle, there is no 
reason that this separation must necessarily lead to poor underwriting, and in any event 
such problems do not imply anything about contagion or systemic events. 
Another key component of securitized banking is in the “securitization” itself: the 
intermediation activities that transfer most of the mortgage loans to outside investors in 
Step 4.  We will discuss this step in detail in Section I of the paper. For our purposes 
here, the key idea is that the outputs of this securitization are often used as collateral in 
Step 1, so that securitized banking is a cycle that requires all steps to keep running.  In 
this paper, we will show how this cycle broke down in the crisis. 
Figure 3 summarizes the relationships between the main elements of traditional and 
securitized banking.  The left column lists the familiar elements of traditional banking: 
reserves, deposit insurance, interest rates on deposits, and the holding of loans on balance 
sheet.  Bank solvency is promoted by requiring a fraction of deposits to be held in 
reserve, and in emergencies these reserves can be replenished by borrowing from the 
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central bank.  The analogue in securitized banking is the repo haircut, which forces banks 
to keep some fraction of their assets in reserve when they borrow money through repo 
markets. The next row, deposit insurance, is a promise made by the government to pay 
depositors in the event of default.  The analogue in securitized banking is collateral.  
Next, a bank in need of cash can raise deposit rates to attract it; the analogues for 
securitized banking are the repo rates.  Finally, the cash raised in traditional banking is 
lent out, with the resulting loans held on the balance sheet.  In securitized banking, funds 
are lent only temporarily, with loans repackaged and resold as securitized bonds.  Some 
of these bonds are also used as collateral to raise more funds, which completes the cycle. 
The “run on repo” can be seen in Figure 4, which plots a “haircut index” from 2007 to 
2008.  The details of this index will be explained below in Section III; for now, just think 
of the index as an average haircut for collateral used in repo transactions, not including 
U.S. treasury securities.  This index rises from zero in early 2007 to nearly 50 percent at 
the peak of the crisis in late 2008. During this time period, several classes of assets 
stopped entirely from being used as collateral, an unprecedented event that is equivalent 
to a haircut of 100 percent.  
To see how the increase in haircuts can drive the banking system to insolvency, take 
as a benchmark a repo market size of, for example, $10 trillion. With zero haircuts, this is 
the amount of financing that banks can achieve in the repo markets.  When the weighted-
average haircut reaches, say, 20 percent, then banks have a shortage of $2 trillion. In the 
crisis, some of this amount was raised early on by issuing new securities. But, this fell far 
short of what was needed. Furthermore, selling the underlying collateral drives asset 
prices down, which then reinforces the cycle: lower prices, less collateral, more concerns 
about solvency, and ever increasing haircuts. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we provide 
institutional background for our analysis, with a discussion of the growth of securitized 
banking, using subprime mortgages as the case study.  We use this case study to provide 
more detail for Step 4 in Figure 2, and to explain the mechanics of securitization and the 
repo market. 
In Section II, we introduce and explain the two main state variables used in the paper: 
the ABX index – which proxies for fundamentals in the subprime mortgage market – and 
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the LIB-OIS, which is the spread between the LIBOR rate (for unsecured interbank 
borrowing) and the rate on an overnight interest swap, OIS (a proxy for the risk-free 
rate).  The LIB-OIS can be thought of as a proxy for counterparty risk in repo 
transactions.  We then plot these state variables for 2007 and 2008 and review the 
timeline for the crisis. The ABX data show that the deterioration of the subprime market 
began in early 2007.  As is now well known, this deterioration had a direct impact on 
banks, which had many of these securitized assets and pre-securitized mortgages on their 
balance sheets.  This real deterioration in bank balance sheets became apparent in the 
interbank markets in mid-2007, as evidenced by an upward spike in the LIB-OIS in 
August.  This state variable remained in a historically high but narrow range until 
September 2008, when the events at Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman, and AIG led to a 
rapid deterioration in interbank markets and increase in the LIB-OIS that persisted until 
the end of 2008.    
We posit that the increased risk at banks had several interrelated effects, all of which 
centered on the securitized assets used as collateral in the repo market.  We provide 
evidence for these effects, using a data set with information on securitized bonds, credit-
default swaps, and other assets used in repo transactions.  These data are created by large 
financial institutions and are used for trading and portfolio valuation by a wide range of 
market participants.  Section III provides summary statistics on these data and illustrates 
how some of these assets co-moved with the ABX and the LIB-OIS.  
Section IV gives the main empirical results of the paper. Without a structural model 
of repo markets, we are only able to talk about co-movement of spreads on various assets, 
and thus we use the language of “correlation” rather than “causation” in our empirical 
analysis. Section IV.A explains our methodology and presents results for a few 
representative asset classes. Section IV.B uses the full set of asset classes to demonstrate 
that it was the interbank markets (LIB-OIS), and not the subprime housing market 
(ABX), that was correlated with increases in the spreads on non-subprime securitized 
assets and related derivatives.  These increased spreads are equivalent to a price decrease, 
which represents a fall in the value of collateral used in repo transactions. Then, as 
lenders began to fear for the stability of the banks and the possibility that they might need 
to seize and sell collateral, the borrowers were forced to raise repo rates and haircuts. 
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Both of these increases occurred in the crisis. In Section IV.C, we find that these 
increases were correlated with changes in the LIB-OIS (for repo rates) and changes in the 
volatility of the underlying collateral (for repo haircuts).  It is the rise in haircuts that 
constitutes the run on repo. 
Section V reviews our arguments and concludes the paper.  Appendix A defines some 
of the paper’s terminology that may be unfamiliar for some readers, and also includes 
descriptions for each of the asset classes of securitized bonds that are used in our 
empirical analysis. Appendix B gives more detail on the data construction. 
 
I. Institutional Background 
This section discusses the main institutional features that intersected in the crisis: the 
subprime mortgage market (Section I.A), securitization (Section I.B), and repo finance 
(Section I.C). 
 
A. The Subprime Mortgage Market 
Home ownership for all Americans has been a long-standing national goal. This goal 
was behind the origins of modern housing finance during the Great Depression with the 
New Deal’s National Housing Act of 1934 (see, e.g., Fishback, Horrace and Kantor 
(2001)).  For example, as President Bush put it in 2004: “Not enough minorities own 
their own homes.  … One thing I’ve done is I’ve called on private sector mortgage banks 
and banks to be more aggressive about lending to first-time home buyers.” 4 The private 
sector responded. 
The subprime mortgage market is a financial innovation, aimed at providing housing 
finance to (disproportionately poor and minority) people with some combination of 
spotty credit histories, a lack of income documentation, or no money for a down 
payment.  Historically, this group was perceived by banks as too risky to qualify for the 
usual mortgage products, for example, a 30-year fixed rate mortgage. As explained by 
Gorton (2008), the innovation was to structure the mortgage to effectively make the 
maturity two or three years. This was accomplished with a fixed initial-period interest 
rate, but then at the “reset date” having the rate rise significantly, essentially requiring the                                                         
4 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040326-15.html . 
  7 
borrower to refinance the mortgage. With rising home prices, borrowers would build 
equity in their homes and would be able to refinance.  
The innovation was a success, if measured in terms of originations. In the years 2001-
2006, a total of about $2.5 trillion of subprime mortgages were originated.5  Almost half 
of this total came in 2005 and 2006, a large portion of which was likely refinancings of 
previous mortgages. 
 
B. Securitization 
An important part of the subprime mortgage innovation was how the mortgages were 
financed.  In 2005 and 2006, about 80 percent of the subprime mortgages were financed 
via securitization, that is, the mortgages were sold in residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS), which involves pooling thousands of mortgages together, selling the 
pool to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which finances their purchase by issuing 
investment-grade securities (i.e., bonds with ratings in the categories of AAA, AA, A, 
BBB) with different seniority (called “tranches”) in the capital markets. Securitization 
does not involve public issuance of equity in the SPV. SPVs are bankruptcy remote in the 
sense that the originator of the underlying loans cannot claw back those assets if the 
originator goes bankrupt.  Also, the SPV is designed so that it cannot go bankrupt.6   
RMBS are the largest component of the broader market for asset-backed securities 
(ABS), which includes similar structures for student loans, credit-card receivables, 
equipment loans, and many others. Figure 5 shows the annual issuance of debt in the 
important fixed income markets in the U.S. The figure shows that: (1) the mortgage-
related market is by far the largest fixed-income market in the U.S., by issuance; but 
further, (2), that restricting attention to non-mortgage instruments, the asset-backed 
securitization market is very large, exceeding the issuance of all corporate debt in the 
U.S. in 2004, 2005, and 2006.  Overall, the figure shows that securitization is a very 
large, significant, part of the capital markets.  
Securitization spawned a large number of new financial instruments and new usages 
for old instruments. Among these are asset-backed securities credit default swaps                                                         
5 See Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2007 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, Key Data (2006), Joint 
Economic Committee (October 2007). 
6 On the process of securitization generally, see Gorton and Souleles (2006).  
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(CDS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs).7 Credit default swaps are derivative contracts under which one party insures 
another party against a loss due to default with reference to a specific corporate entity, 
securitization bond, or index. For our purposes, the CDS spread, which is the fixed 
coupon paid by the party providing the protection, is an indication of the risk premium 
with regard to the specified corporate entity. CDOs are securitizations of corporate bonds 
or asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities. CLOs are securitizations of loans to 
corporations. CDOs are relevant here for two reasons. First, the underlying CDO 
portfolios contained tranches of subprime securitizations, making their value sensitive to 
subprime risk. And second, like asset-backed securities generally, they too depend on the 
repo market. 
Figure 6 shows how the pieces of the securitization process fit together.  This figure is 
an expansion of Step 4 from the securitized-banking diagram shown in Figure 2, and also 
includes Step 1 from Figure 2, while omitting Steps 2 and 3.  The starting point is a bank 
with a set of loans in its “inventory”.  The bank does not have the resources to keep all of 
these loans on its balance sheet – in securitized-banking the profit comes from the 
intermediation, not from holding the loans. In Step 4, these loans are transferred to the 
SPV and placed in one big pool.  This pool is the assets of the SPV, which builds a 
capital structure on those assets using different layers, called tranches. The idea here is 
that the first losses on the pool will be allocated to the equity layer at the bottom, with 
additional losses moving up the capital structure, by seniority, until they reach the AAA 
tranche at the top.  These layers and rating are represented by the asset-backed securities 
(ABS) issued by the SPV.  Since the assets backing these securities are mortgages, the 
ABS goes by the specialized name of residential-mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in 
this case.  
These ABS may be sold directly to investors (Step 5), or may instead be securitized in 
a CDO (Step 6).  A CDO will have a tranche structure similar to an ABS. The tranches of 
the CDO may be sold directly to investors (Step 7), or resecuritized into further levels of 
CDOs (not shown in figure).  In some cases, the ABS or CDO tranches may return to the                                                         
7 Other innovations, like structured investment vehicles, synthetic CDOs, and so on, are discussed in 
Gorton (2008).  Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) discuss loan sales by banks. 
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balance sheets of the banks, where they may be used as collateral in the repo transaction 
of Step 1.    
With each level of securitization, the SPV will often combine many lower-rated 
(BBB, BBB-) tranches into a new vehicle that has mostly AAA and AA rated tranches, a 
process that relies on well-behaved default models. This slicing and recombining is 
driven by a strong demand for highly rated securities for use as investments and 
collateral: essentially, there is not enough AAA debt in the world to satisfy demand, so 
the banking system has set out to manufacture the supply. As emphasized by Gorton 
(2008), it can be very difficult to pierce the veil of a CDO and learn exactly what lies 
behind each tranche.  This opacity was a fundamental part of pre-crisis securitization, and 
was not limited to subprime-based assets.8  
C. The Repo Market 
A repurchase agreement (or “repo”) is a financial contract used by market participants 
as a financing method to meet short and long-term liquidity needs.9 A repurchase 
agreement is a two-part transaction. The first part is the transfer of specified securities by 
one party, the “bank” or “borrower,” to another party, the “depositor” or “lender,” in 
exchange for cash: the depositor holds the bond, and the bank holds the cash. The second 
part of the transaction consists of a contemporaneous agreement by the bank to 
repurchase the securities at the original price, plus an agreed upon additional amount on a 
specified future date.  It is important to note that repurchase agreements, like derivatives, 
do not end up in bankruptcy court if one party defaults. The non-defaulting party has the 
option to simply walk away from the transaction, keeping either the cash or the bonds.10   
                                                        
8 As explained by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Dang, Gorton, and Holmström (2009), such opacity 
makes these instruments liquid by preventing adverse selection. 
9 For background on the repo market, see Corrigan and de Terá (2007) and Bank for International 
Settlements (1999). 10 Sale and repurchase agreements, like derivatives, have a special status under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
Repurchase agreements are exempted from the automatic stay and allows a party to a repurchase agreement 
to unilaterally enforce the termination provisions of the agreement as a result of a bankruptcy filing by the 
other party.   Without this protection, a party to a repo contract would be a debtor in the bankruptcy 
proceedings. The safe harbor provision for repo transactions was recently upheld in court in a case 
involving American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. suing Lehman Brothers. See Schweitzer, 
Grosshandler, and Gao (2008). 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While there are no official statistics on the overall size of the repo market, it may be 
about $12 trillion (though that may involve double counting for both lender and 
borrower), compared to the total assets in the U.S. banking system of $10 trillion.11 
According to Hördahl and King (2008), “the (former) top US investment banks funded 
roughly half of their assets using repo markets, with additional exposure due to off-
balance sheet financing of their customers” (p. 39).  One way to get a sense of the growth 
in the securitized-banking system is to compare the total assets in the traditional regulated 
banking system to the total assets in the dealer (investment) banks, since the latter rely 
more heavily on repo finance than the former.  For this purpose, Federal Flow of Funds 
data are available, and this is shown in Figure 7, below. The figure shows that the ratio of 
broker-dealer total assets to banks’ total assets has grown from about six percent in 1990 
to a peak of 30 percent in 2007.  These data do not capture the increasing share of repo in 
total financing for each kind of bank, which cannot be carefully measured with aggregate 
data: to the extent that repo has grown more important at both types of banks, Figure 7 
would understate the increased role of repo finance over time. 
 
II. State Variables: The ABX Indices and the LIB-OIS Spread 
This section introduces the key “state variables” of the paper.  Section II.A 
discusses the ABX indices, which are proxies for fundamentals of the subprime market.  
Section II.B discusses the LIB-OIS spread, which is a proxy for fears about bank 
solvency.  In Section II.C, we plot these two state variables against the timeline of the 
crisis. 
 
A. Subprime Fundamentals and the ABX Indices 
With respect to the housing market, the fundamentals essentially are housing prices 
and changes in housing prices. Subprime mortgages are very sensitive to housing prices, 
as shown by Gorton (2008). How was information about the fundamentals in the                                                         
11 Hördahl and King (2008) report that repo markets have doubled in size since 2002, “with gross amounts 
outstanding at year-end 2007 of roughly $10 trillion in each of the U.S. and euro markets, and another $1 
trillion in the UK repo market” (p. 37).  They report that the U.S. repo market exceeded $10 trillion in mid-
2008, including double counting.  See Hördahl and King (2008), p. 39.  According to Fed data, primary 
dealers reported financing $4.5 trillion in fixed income securities with repo as of March 4, 2008.  
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subprime mortgage market revealed to market participants? There are no secondary 
markets for the securities related to subprime (mortgage-backed securities, collateralized 
debt obligations). But, in the beginning of 2006, the growth in the subprime securitization 
market led to the creation of several subprime-related indices. Specifically, dealer banks 
launched the ABX.HE (ABX) index in January 2006. The ABX Index is a credit 
derivative that references 20 equally-weighted subprime RMBS tranches. There are also 
sub-indices linked to a basket of subprime bonds with specific ratings: AAA, AA, A, 
BBB and BBB-. Each sub-index references the 20 subprime RMBS bonds with the rating 
level of the subindex. Every six months the indices are reconstituted based on a pre-
identified set of rules, and a new vintage of the index and sub-indices are issued.12  
Gorton (2009) argues that the introduction of the ABX indices is important because it 
opened a (relatively) liquid, publicly observable market that priced subprime risk. The 
other subprime-related instruments, RMBSs and CDOs, did not trade in publicly 
observable markets. In fact, securitized products generally have no secondary trading that 
is publicly visible. Thus, for our purposes the ABX indices are important because of the 
information revelation about the value of subprime mortgages, which in turn depends on 
house prices. Keep in mind that house price indices, like the S&P Case-Shiller Indices, 
are calculated with a two-month lag.13  Furthermore, house price indices are not directly 
relevant because of the complicated structure of subprime securitizations. 
In this paper, we will focus on the BBB ABX tranche of the first vintage of the ABX 
in 2006, which is representative of the riskier levels of subprime securitization. We refer 
to this tranche of the 2006-1 issue simply as “ABX”.  In the next section, we show how 
the ABX evolved during the crisis, and compare this evolution with deterioration in the 
interbank markets.  
 
B. The Interbank Market and the LIB-OIS Spread 
Our proxy for the state of the interbank market and, in particular, the repo market, 
is the spread between 3-month LIBOR and the overnight index swap (OIS) rate, which                                                         
12 The index is overseen by Markit Partners.  The dealers provide Markit Partners with daily and monthly 
marks. See http://www.markit.com/information/products/abx.html.  
13 See 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_csmahp/0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0
,0,0,0.html . 
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we call the LIB-OIS spread.  LIBOR is the rate paid on unsecured interbank loans, cash 
loans where the borrower receives an agreed amount of money either at call or for a given 
period of time, at an agreed interest rate.  These loans are not tradable.  Basically, a cash-
rich bank “deposits” money with a cash-poor bank for a period of time.  The rate on such 
a deposit is LIBOR, which is the interest rate at which banks are willing to lend cash to 
other financial institutions “in size.” The British Bankers’ Association’s (BBA) London 
interbank offer rate (LIBOR) fixings are calculated by taking the average of a survey 
financial institutions operating in the London interbank market.14 The BBA publishes 
daily fixings for LIBOR deposits of maturities up to a year. 
From the 3-month LIBOR rate we will subtract a measure of interest rate 
expectations over the same term.  This rate is the overnight index swap (OIS) rate.  The 
overnight index swap is a fixed-to-floating interest rate swap that ties the floating leg of 
the contract to a daily overnight reference rate (here, the fed-funds rate).15 The floating 
rate of the swap is equal to the geometric average of the overnight index over every day 
of the payment period. When an OIS matures, the counterparties exchange the difference 
between the fixed rate and the average effective fed-funds rate over the time period 
covered by the swap, settling the trade on a net basis. The fixed quote on an OIS should 
represent the expected average of the overnight target rate over the term of the 
agreement. As with swaps generally, there is no exchange of principal and only the net 
difference in interest rates is paid at maturity, so OIS contracts have little credit risk 
exposure. 
If there is no credit risk and no transactions costs, then the interest rate on an 
interbank loan should equal the overnight index swap (the expected fed funds cost of the 
loan).  To see this consider an example: Bank 1 loans Bank 2 $10 million for three 
months.  Bank 1 funds the loan by borrowing $10 million each day in the overnight fed-
funds market.  Further, Bank 1 hedges the interest-rate risk by entering into an overnight 
index swap under which Bank 1 agrees to pay a counterparty the difference between the 
contracted fixed rate and the overnight fed-funds rate over the next three months.  In the 
past arbitrage has kept this difference below 10 bps.                                                         
14 The BBA eliminates the highest and lowest quartiles of the distribution and average the remaining 
quotes.  See Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008). 
15 There are equivalent swaps in other currencies, which reference other rates. 
  13 
If the spread between LIBOR and the OIS widens, there is an apparent arbitrage 
opportunity.  But, at some times, banks are not taking advantage of it.  Why?  The answer 
is that there is counterparty risk: that is, Bank 1 worries that Bank 2 will default and so 
there is a premium between the expected interest rates over the period, the OIS rate, and 
the rate on the loan, LIBOR. We refer to the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the 
3-month OIS as “LIB-OIS,” and think of this spread as a state variable for counterparty 
risk in the banking system. 
 
C. A Timeline for the Crisis 
In Figure 8, we show the ABX and LIB-OIS spreads. For the ABX, we use the 
2006-1 BBB tranche in all cases. The time period is from January 1, 2007 through 
December 25, 2008. During the full period, the ABX makes a steady rise, whereas the 
LIB-OIS shows two jumps, in August 2007 and September 2008. These months are not 
particularly special for the ABX.  Furthermore, the LIB-OIS recovers some ground at the 
end of 2008, while the ABX spread continues to grow.  It is difficult to explain why the 
LIB-OIS spikes occur exactly at these times, and we are not attempting an explanation 
here. Instead, these figures are intended only to illustrate that the spikes are not 
concurrent with major changes in the ABX. 
The first six months of 2007 were ordinary for the vast majority of fixed income 
assets. It is only when we look at subprime-specific markets that we begin to see the 
seeds of the crisis.  The ABX begins the year at 153 basis points (bps), which is close to 
its historical average since the series began in January 2006, after a first year with almost 
no volatility.  The first signs of trouble appear at the end of January, and by March 1 the 
spread was 552bps.  The next sustained rise came in June, reaching 669bps by the end of 
that month. In contrast, the LIB-OIS hardly moved during the period, steady at around 
8bps.  
Of particular interest is the summer of 2007, where the LIB-OIS first signals 
danger in the interbank market.  From its steady starting value of 8 bps, LIB-OIS grows 
to 13 bps on July 26, before exploding past its historical record to 40 bps on August 9, 
and to new milestones in the weeks ahead before peaking at 96 bps on September 10.  
This period also marked the initial shock for a wide swath of the securitization markets, 
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particularly in high-grade tranches commonly used as collateral in the repo market. The 
ABX is also rising during this period, but its most significant move begins earlier, and 
visually appears to lead the LIB-OIS.  From its starting value of 669 bps at the end of 
June, the spread rises to 1738 bps by the end of July, before any significant move in the 
LIB-OIS.  
The ABX spread continued its steady rise in the first half of 2008, going from 
3812 bps to 6721 bps over the six-month period from January 1 to June 30. Once again, 
the LIB-OIS is behaving differently from the ABX, with trading in a band between 30 
and 90 bps. The reduction in the LIB-OIS in January is followed by increases through 
February and March, coincident – or perhaps causal – of the trouble at Bear Stearns, 
which reached its climax with its announced sale to JP Morgan on March 16.  
In the second half of 2008, the full force of the panic hit asset markets, financial 
institutions, and the real economy.  The ABX spread continued its steady rise, with prices 
of pennies on the dollar and spreads near 9000 bps by the end of the period.  The LIB-
OIS, after a period of stability in the summer, began to rise in early September, and then 
passed the 100 bps threshold for the first time on the September 15 bankruptcy filing of 
Lehman Brothers. The subsequent weeks heralded near collapse of the interbank market, 
with the LIB-OIS peaking at 364 bps on October 10, before falling back to 128 bps by the 
end of 2008. 
   With this background, we turn next to the broad set of assets included in our data 
set. 
 
III. Data 
Our data comes from dealer banks. The dealer banks observe market prices and 
convert these prices into spreads.  The conversion of prices into spreads involves models 
of default timing and recovery amounts, and we are not privy to these models. However, 
one indication of the quality of the data is that it was the source for marking-to-market 
the books of some major institutions. The data set comprises 392 series of spreads on 
structured products, credit derivative indices, and a smaller set of single-company credit 
derivatives.  In each case, the banks capture the “on-the-run” bond or tranche, which 
would be the spreads of interest to market participants. Fixed-rate bond spreads are 
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spreads to Treasuries and floating-rate spreads are to LIBOR. Appendix B contains a 
brief discussion of spread calculation. 
Some examples of the asset classes covered include spreads on credit-card 
securitization tranches, auto-loan securitization tranches, and all other major 
securitization classes. For each asset class, e.g., securitized credit-card receivables, there 
are spreads for each maturity, each rating category, and often for both fixed- and floating-
rate bonds. For example, for fixed-rate credit-card receivables there are spreads for AAA 
bonds for maturities from two years to ten years.  Also included are spreads on CDO and 
CLO tranches. Some series date back as far as January 2001, and others begin as late as 
2006. Spreads are based on transactions prices, and if there are no such prices, then the 
series ends.  
Table I provides summary statistics on various categories of asset classes. Panel A 
shows the spreads in basis points. Our state variable, LIB-OIS spreads, are shown first, 
followed by representative asset classes that were exposed to subprime: home-equity 
loans (HEL), mezzanine-collateralized-debt obligations (Mezzanine CDO), home-
equity lines-of-credit (HELOC); also shown are the CDS spreads for Countrywide and 
Washington Mutual (“Wamu”), two of the largest subprime mortgage originators; 
finally, three of the monoline insurers’ CDS spreads are shown.  These firms were 
alleged to have been heavily exposed to subprime risks via credit guarantees made on 
subprime-related bonds. 
Throughout Table I there are five periods shown: the whole period (January 2007-
January 2009); the first half of 2007, the second half of 2007, all of 2007, and “all of 
2008” (which also includes January 2009).  In general, the first half of 2007 looks 
“normal” in the sense that it is prior to the panic.  Looking at LIB-OIS, for example, the 
average is about 8 basis points for the first half of 2007, consistent with no arbitrage and 
no counterparty risk. Also, note that AAA HELOC bonds traded at just over 15 basis 
points in the first half of 2007. The mortgage originators and monolines were also trading 
in normal spread ranges. 
Looking at Panel A, it is clear that the subprime-related structured products and 
companies get hit in the second half of 2007.  HEL, Mezzanine CDOs and HELOCs 
reach their peaks in the second half of 2007. Note that in the cases of HEL BBB and 
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HELOC AAA there are no data in 2008; these markets simply disappear.16 This is also 
true of Countrywide, perhaps the largest originator of subprime mortgages.  But, for 
WAMU and the monoline insurers the peak is in 2008. 
The standard deviations are also worth noting. For the subprime-related structured 
asset classes, the peak of their spreads occurs in the second half of 2007, but the standard 
deviations are mostly highest in 2008.  Thinking of standard deviations as a rough guide 
to uncertainty, this temporal sequence of rising uncertainty will be important later when 
we look at the repo market in detail. 
Panel B shows asset classes that are non-subprime-related structured products 
based on U.S. portfolios: automobile loans, credit-card receivables, student loans, 
commercial mortgage-backed securities, high-grade structured-finance CDOs (HG SF 
CDO), and mezzanine structured-finance CDOs (Mezzanine SF CDO). In each case, 
we show the AAA tranches.  In the first half of 2007, the normal state of affairs is that 
AAA asset-backed securities traded below LIBOR, true of auto loans, credit card 
receivables, and student loans.  For the six categories shown, there are increases in the 
spreads in the second half of 2007, but the large increases are in 2008.  
Figure 9 is an illustration of the time-series patterns for a few of these non-
subprime asset classes: automobile loans, credit-card receivables, and student loans.  In 
each case, the spreads appear to move closely with the LIB-OIS.  These co-movements 
represent an important aspect of the crisis: the apparent relationship of the interbank 
market (LIB-OIS) with spreads on securities far removed from subprime housing. In 
Section IV, we will perform formal tests of these relationships. 
The crisis was global. Panel C shows non-U.S. non-subprime-related asset 
classes, including mortgage-backed securities with portfolios of Australian, U.K., and 
Dutch mortgages.  Also shown are U.K. credit-card receivables, European consumer 
loans, and European automobile loans. These categories are all trading normally in the 
first half of 2007, and show increases in their spreads during the second half of 2007. 
But, the spreads significantly widen in 2008, as do the standard deviations of their 
spreads.                                                          
16 The dealer banks only use on-the-run prices to calculate spreads.  If there are no on-the-run prices, no 
spreads are calculated. 
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Panel D summarizes the data on the interbank repo market.17 Shown are different 
categories of collateral, in each row. The categories themselves show how far the repo 
market has evolved from simply being a market related to U.S. Treasuries.  For each 
category the annualized repo rate spread to the overnight index swap rate is shown. These 
spreads are for overnight repo.18  Also shown is the average haircut on the collateral 
during the time period. For example, looking at the first category, BBB+/A Corporates, 
the average repo rate spread to OIS in the first half of 2007 was 2 bps, and the haircut 
was zero. Repo spreads for AA-AAA corporate bond collateral were negative for the first 
half of 2007. Overall, the patterns in repo are similar to those for the non-subprime-
related asset classes, that is, the spreads rise in the second half of 2007, but become 
dramatically higher in 2008.  The haircuts also become dramatically higher in 2008. The 
market disappeared for unpriced CLO/CDO, unpriced ABS/MBS/all subprime, and 
for AA-AAA CDOs.   
The last row in Panel E gives summary data for the Repo-Rate Index and the 
Repo-Haircut Index – the latter index is plotted in Figure 4 and discussed in the 
Introduction of this paper.  During the time that all asset classes have active repo markets 
in 2007 and early 2008, the Repo-Rate Index is identical to the equal-weighted average 
for all the asset classes.  As haircuts rise to 100% for any given asset class (= no trade) on 
date t, we drop that class from the index and compute the index change for period t using 
only the classes that traded in both period t-1 and period t.  The Repo-Haircut Index is 
always equal to the average haircut on all nine of the asset classes, with 100 percent rates 
included in this average.  
 
IV. Empirical Tests 
A. Methodology and Basic Tests 
We want to test whether the spreads on U.S. non-subprime-related asset classes 
(AAA tranches) move with our state variables for the subprime market (ABX) and for 
interbank counterparty risk (LIB-OIS). For each asset, we want to estimate 
                                                         
17 Repo rates and haircuts could be different for non-dealer bank counterparties, such as hedge funds. 
18 Though not analyzed in this paper, the full term structure of repo spreads out to one year, tells a similar 
story. 
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,   (1) 
 
where t is time a weekly time index, Si,t is the spread on asset i at time t, a0 is a constant, 
a1 is a time trend, ABXt is a vector of the last four observations of the ABX spread 
including the current period, LIB-OISt is a vector of the last four observations of the 
LIB-OIS spread including the current period, and Xt is a vector of control variables.  
Since the Si,t spreads are more similar to unit-root prices than to i.i.d returns, and since 
these levels vary significantly over our time period, we take first differences of (1) and 
normalize all changes by their level in the previous period: 
 
   (2) 
 
where the Δ prefix indicates the percentage change of the variable or vector. (Throughout 
our analysis, all references to “changes” will be “percentage changes”.) While there is a 
small literature on corporate-bond spreads (see Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 
(2001), and the citations therein), there are no studies of spreads on securitized products. 
We follow Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) in their choice of control 
variables:19 
  
• The 10-year constant maturity treasury rate (10YTreasury),  
• The square of 10YTreasury, (10YTreasured Squared)  
• The weekly return of the SP500 Index (SP500_ret).   
• The VIX index (VIX), which is a weighted average of eight implied volatilities of 
near-the-money options on the S&P 100 index.  
• The slope of the yield curve, (YCSlope), defined as the difference between the 
10-year and 2-year Treasury bond interest rates.  
• The overnight swap spread (OIS). 
                                                         
19 Since most of our series are not related to specific companies, we omit the company-specific control 
variables used by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001).  
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Panel E of Table I gives summary data on these control variables.  Notably, the 10-
year Treasury rate and the OIS rate both decline significantly in 2008, reflecting the 
Fed’s actions.  The return on the S&P is negative in 2008.  And, notably, the VIX index 
in 2008 is about double its level in 2007. In each case, the control variables are first-
differenced for estimation of Equation (2). 
Some preliminary regression results are given in Table II.  Panel A shows the 
results for the six asset classes of U.S. non-subprime-related assets (AAA tranches) 
shown in Table I, Panel B.  At the bottom of the table are F-tests corresponding to the 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the ABX variables are jointly zero and that the 
coefficients on the LIB-OIS variables are jointly zero. For the four securitization 
categories – credit cards, auto loans, student loans, and commercial mortgage-backed 
securities – the LIB-OIS variables are jointly significant. F-tests also show that the ABX 
coefficients are not jointly significant in any of the regressions.. For the two categories of 
CDO, high grade (HG) and mezzanine, neither the LIB-OIS nor the ABX are significant. 
Panel B of Table II addresses the global aspects of the crisis. Panel B covers non-U.S. 
non-subprime related asset classes, the same ones displayed in Panel C of Table I. All of 
these asset classes are significantly affected by LIB-OIS, but not by the ABX.  
 
B. Credit Spreads for All Categories and Tranches 
Table II focuses on a subset of the available asset categories, a subset that we think is 
of particular interest, but nevertheless a subset. Table III summarizes the F-tests for the 
joint significance of the changes in LIB-OIS, for the full set of asset categories, broken 
down into the following categories: subprime-related, U.S.; non-subprime-related; non-
U.S. non-subprime-related; financial firms (CDS spreads); and industrial firms (CDS 
spreads). The table has three panels, corresponding to the whole period from January 4, 
2007 to January 29, 2009, and sub-periods.  We also performed similar F-tests for the 
ABX and lags on all asset categories.  These results are not tabulated, because there is 
nothing of interest to show: overall, changes in the ABX are no better than noise at 
predicting changes in spreads. 
Some highlights from Table III are as follows. Subprime-related asset categories and 
the broad-array of financial firms are not typically correlated to the LIB-OIS.  But, for the 
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overall period, Panel A, 66 percent of the U.S. non-subprime asset classes are 
significantly positively correlated at the 10 percent confidence level. Similarly, 76 
percent of the non-U.S. non-subprime categories are positively correlated at the 10 
percent level or lower.  Note that most of this occurs in 2007 for the non-U.S. structured 
products, but for the U.S. non-subprime structured products it is split across 2007 and 
2008. Also, note that for 2008, Panel C shows that 75 percent of the industrials are 
significantly, positively correlated to changes in LIB-OIS, indicating the real affects 
hitting the economy. In 2007, Panel B, there are no such real effects. 
Table IV presents the F-test results divided by rating category.  Assets in all rating 
categories were eligible for repo, but AAA collateral was likely to be the most widely 
used.  The table is suggestive in this regard, but not definitive.  Looking at the whole 
period, Panel A, 62% of the AAA products were positively and significantly correlated 
with changes in LIB-OIS.  This is about equally divided between the two sub-periods. 
For AA, A and BBB rated bonds, the percentages that are significantly positive for the 
whole period are 28, 55 and 53 percent, respectively.  For A and BBB this is about 
equally divided between the two subperiods. 
 
C. Repo Spreads and Haircuts 
In a world with known values for collateral and no transactions costs for selling 
collateral, repo rates should be equal to the risk-free rate, and spreads would be zero: a 
lender/depositor would have no fear of default, since the collateral could be freely seized 
and sold.  In reality, collateral pricing can be uncertain, and illiquidity and volatility in 
the secondary markets for this collateral can induce large transactions costs following a 
default.  In this case, measures of bank-counterparty risk (LIB-OIS) may be relevant to 
lenders, and in the case of default they would be sensitive to uncertainty about collateral 
values. Lenders could then demand higher rates and/or higher haircuts. Higher rates 
would occur because the loans are no longer risk free; higher haircuts could occur to 
adjust for the uncertain value of the collateral, since each dollar of collateral may worth 
much less by the time it can be sold.  
To test for the quantitative importance of these relationships, we first estimate a 
version of Equation (2) for repo spreads: 
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  (3) 
 
where Rj,t is the average spread of repo rates to the OIS for some class j of collateral (as 
in Table I, Panel D), VOLj,t is a vector of the last four “expected volatilities” (defined 
below) for that class of collateral, and all other variables are defined as in Equation (2).   
VOLj,t is a forward-looking measure, defined here as the average absolute (weekly) 
change in spreads over the next four weeks20:  
 
VOLj ,t =
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4
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∑ ,       (4) 
 
where Sj,t is the average spread to OIS for all assets in class j: 
 
.        (5) 
 
ΔVOLj,t is defined as the difference between expected volatility today and 
realized volatility over the previous four weeks (not including the current week): 
 
  .       (6)  
 
 Note that volatility uses absolute differences, and not percentage differences, because 
percentage differences are harder to interpret across multiple weeks.  Also, since we use 
future information for our expected-volatility proxy, the resulting estimates could not be 
part of an implementable investment strategy. This restriction does not matter for our 
analysis, since we are not seeking to build investment portfolios from these results. In any 
case, we don’t really have a choice here, since there is no way to extract volatility 
expectations from historical spread data alone. 
                                                        
20 All results are qualitatively similar if we use the eight weeks or twelve weeks instead of four weeks. 
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We estimate (3) for all five classes of collateral that have data available to construct 
the VOL measure.21  The regression results for these five classes are shown in Table V. 
The final rows show the results of the F-tests for the joint significance of LIB-OIS (Test 
1), the ABX (Test 2) and VOL changes (Test 3), respectively. These tests show that the 
changes in repo spreads are significantly related to the change in LIB-OIS for all five 
categories, with almost all of the effect coming in the contemporaneous period. Changes 
in repo spreads are not significantly related to changes in the ABX or VOL or to any of 
the other control variables.  Thus, just as we found for credit spreads in our earlier 
analysis, the state variable for bank-counterparty risk is the only significant correlate with 
repo spreads. 
It seems natural that banks would have to raise repo spreads to attract funds. But, 
higher rates do not by themselves cause a systemic event.  For a “run on repo”, we need 
to see that even higher rates are insufficient to keep repo lenders in the market. Our 
simple illustrations of repo haircuts in Section III showed that this did occur.  We next 
explore the factors related to these increases using the same regression framework as we 
did for repo spreads: 
 
 , (7) 
 
where Hj,t is the average haircut for all assets in class j, and all other variables are defined 
as in (3).  Since haircuts are already defined as a percentage of the total value of the 
underlying collateral, the change in haircuts on the left-hand-side of equation (7) is 
already given in percentages. Table VI summarizes the results. As we have found in 
earlier tests, the ABX and the control variables are not significant. In contrast to previous 
regressions, the change in the LIB-OIS is also not significant.  The only variable with any 
explanatory power is the proxy for expected volatility, which is significant for three of 
the five classes of collateral.  
 The key finding here is that both repo spreads and repo haircuts rose during the 
crisis, with these increases correlated either to concerns about counterparty risk (for                                                         
21 For the other four classes of collateral shown in Panel D of Table I, we do not have data for the spreads 
of the underlying assets. 
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spreads), or to uncertainty about collateral values (for haircuts). While these results are 
somewhat different for spreads and haircuts, we suspect that this system is jointly 
determined, and that a disruption in the interbank market and increases in uncertainty 
about collateral are both necessary conditions for a run on repo.   In an environment with 
no counterparty risk, there is no reason to expect haircuts to be affected by uncertainty 
about collateral; similarly, high counterparty risk by itself would be unlikely to affect 
repo spreads if all collateral had fixed values and liquid markets.  It seems unlikely that 
nature will give us an example with rising VOL but no change in LIB-OIS. Instead, all of 
these things happened at the same time, and it is not possible to disentangle the exact 
causes. 
 
V. Conclusion 
How did problems in the subprime mortgages cause a systemic event?  Our 
answer is that there was a run in the repo market. The location and size of subprime risks 
held by counterparties in the repo market were not known and led to fear that liquidity 
would dry up for collateral, in particular non-subprime related collateral.  Uncertainty led 
to increases in the repo haircuts, which is tantamount to massive withdrawals from the 
banking system.  
The banking system has changed, with “securitized banking” playing an 
increasing role alongside traditional banking. One large area of securitized banking – the 
securitization of subprime home mortgages – began to weaken in early 2007, and 
continued to decline throughout 2007 and 2008.  But, the weakening of subprime per se 
was not the shock that caused systemic problems. The first systemic event occurs in 
August 2007, with a shock to the repo market that we demonstrate using the “LIB-OIS,” 
the spread between the LIBOR and the OIS, as a proxy.  The reason that this shock 
occurred in August 2007 – as opposed to any other month of 2007 – is perhaps 
unknowable. We hypothesize that the market slowly became aware of the risks associated 
with the subprime market, which then led to doubts about repo collateral and bank 
solvency.  At some point – August 2007 in this telling – a critical mass of such fears led 
to the first run on repo, with lenders no longer willing to provide short-term finance at 
historical spreads and haircuts. 
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After August 2007, the securitized-banking model was under pressure, with small 
equity bases stretched by increasing haircuts on high-grade collateral. We see evidence of 
this pressure in the co-movement of spreads on a wide variety of AAA and AA credits. 
This pressure contributed to the forced rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the 
failure of Lehman Brothers In September 2008. The second systemic event and run on 
repo occurred with the failure of Lehman. In this second event, we see parallels to 19th 
century banking crises, with a famine of liquidity leading to significant premia on even 
the safest of assets.  
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Appendix A: Glossary of Key Terms and Asset Classes 
 
This glossary provides definitions for all terms given in bold in the body of the 
paper and all asset classes listed in Table 1. For the latter group, we include the panel 
location of that variable in parenthesis following the definition (e.g: Table I – Panel A).  
 
AA-AAA ABS RMBS/CMBS: Residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) 
or commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) with ratings between AA and AAA, 
inclusive.  (Table I - Panel D) 
<AA ABS RMBS-CMBS: Residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) or 
commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) with ratings between AA and AAA, 
inclusive. (Table I - Panel D) 
AA-AAA CDO: Collateralized debt obligations (CDO) with ratings between 
AA and AAA, inclusive. (Table I - Panel D) 
AA-AAA CLO: Collateralized loan obligations (CDO) with ratings between 
AA and AAA, inclusive. (Table I - Panel D) 
A-AAA ABS Auto/CC/SL:  Asset-backed securities (ABS) comprised of auto 
loans, credit-card receivables, or student loans, with ratings between A and AAA, 
inclusive. (Table I - Panel D) 
ABX, ABX  Index, ABX  Index Spread: The ABX Index is a credit derivative that 
references 20 equally-weighted subprime RMBS tranches. There are also sub-indices 
linked to a basket of subprime bonds with specific ratings: AAA, AA, A BBB and BBB-. 
Each sub-index references the 20 subprime RMBS bonds with the rating level of the 
subindex. Every six months the indices are reconstituted based on a pre-identified set of 
rules, and a new vintage of the index and sub-indices are issued. In this paper, we focus 
on the BBB ABX tranche of the first vintage of the ABX in 2006, which is representative 
of the riskier levels of subprime securitization. We refer to this tranche of the 2006-1 
issue simply as “ABX”.   
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS):  An asset-backed security is a bond which is 
backed by the cash flows from a pool of specified assets in a special purpose vehicle 
rather than the general credit of a corporation.  The asset pools may be residential 
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mortgages, in which case it is a residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS), 
commercial mortgages – a commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS), automobile 
loans, credit card receivables, student loans, aircraft leases, royalty payments, and many 
other asset classes. 
Australia RMBS AAA: AAA-rated RMBS backed by Australian mortgages. 
(Table I – Panel C) 
Auto AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by auto loans. (Table 1 – Panel B) 
BBB+/A Corporates: Corporate bonds rated between BBB+ and A, inclusive. 
(Table I - Panel D) 
Cards AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by credit-card receivables. (Table I – Panel 
B) 
CMBS AAA:  AAA-rated Commercial-mortgage-backed securities. (Table I – 
Panel B)  
Credit Default Swaps (CDS):  A credit default swap is derivative contract in 
which one party agrees to pay the other a fixed periodic coupon for the specified life of 
the agreement. The other party makes no payments unless a specified credit event occurs. 
Credit events are typically defined to include a material default, bankruptcy or debt 
restructuring for a specified reference asset. If such a credit event occurs, the party makes 
a payment to the first party, and the swap then terminates. The size of the payment is 
usually linked to the decline in the reference asset's market value following the credit 
event. 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs): A CDO is a special purpose vehicle, 
which buys a portfolio of fixed income assets, and finances the purchase of the portfolio 
via issuing different tranches of risk in the capital markets. These tranches are senior 
tranches, rated Aaa/AAA, mezzanine tranches, rated Aa/AA to Ba/BB, and equity 
tranches (unrated).  Of particular interest are ABS CDOs, which have underlying 
portfolios consisting of asset-backed securities (ABS), including residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). 
Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs): A CLO is a securitization of 
commercial bank loans. 
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Commercial Mortgage-backed Securities (CMBS): See asset-backed 
securities, above. 
Dutch RMBS AAA: AAA-rated RMBS backed by Dutch mortgages. (Table I – 
Panel C) 
European Auto AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by European auto loans (Table I 
– Panel C) 
European Consumer Receivables AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by European 
consumer receivables (Table I – Panel C) 
Haircut: The collateral pledged by borrowers towards the repo has a haircut or 
“initial margin” applied, which means the collateral is valued at less than market value. 
This haircut reflects the perceived underlying risk of the collateral and protects the lender 
against a change in its value. Haircuts are different for different asset classes and ratings. 
HEL BBB: BBB-rated ABS backed by Home-equity loans with BBB ratings 
(Table 1- Panel A) 
HELOC AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by Home-equity lines-of-credit (Table 
I- Panel A) 
HG SF CDO (High-grade structured-finance CDOs): High-grade structured-
finance CDOs buy collateral consisting of the AAA and AA-rated tranches of securitized 
bonds. (Table 1 – Panel B) 
Home-equity loans (HEL): A home equity loan is a line of credit under which a 
home owner can borrower using the home equity as collateral.  
Home-equity lines-of-credit (HELOC): A HELOC differs from a home equity 
loan in that the borrower does not borrower the full amount of the loan at the outset, but 
can draw down the line of credit over a specified period of time with a maximum amount. 
LIB-OIS:  The spread between the LIBOR and the OIS. 
LIBOR: The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a series of interest rates, 
of different maturities and currencies, at which banks offer to lend fund to each other.  
These rates are calculated by the British Bankers’ Association as the averages of quotes 
contributed by a panel of banks and announced at 11:00 Am local time in England.  This 
is called the rate “fixing.” Quotes are ranked and the top and bottom quartiles are 
discarded.  LIBOR is fixed for 15 different maturities, from overnight to one year, and in 
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ten international currencies.  Similar fixing arrangements exist in many markets around 
the world.  See Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008). 
Mezzanine CDO:  A Mezzanine CDO refers to a collateralized debt obligation 
where the underlying portfolio consists of tranches of different asset-backed securities 
that are rated between BBB and A, inclusive.  
Mezzanine SF CDO: Mezzanine structured-finance CDOs buy collateral 
consisting of the A through BBB-rated tranches of securitized bonds. (Table I – Panel B) 
Monoline Insurers, Monoline Insurance Companies (“monolines”): Insurance 
companies that are restricted by regulation to one line of the business, the business of 
issuing financial guarantees on bonds, that is insurance against the loss due to default of 
specified bonds.  The first such company was AMBAC Financial Group Inc., formed in 
1971, followed by MBIA formed in 1983.  In 1989 a law in New York limited the sale of 
financial insurance products by those companies solely to bond insurance, making them 
“monolines.”  
Mortgage Originators: Financial firms that underwrite and fund residential and 
possibly commercial, mortgages. 
OIS: See Overnight Index Swap (Table I – Panel E). 
Overnight Index Swap (OIS): An Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) is a 
fixed/floating interest rate swap where the floating leg of the swap is tied to a published 
index of a daily overnight rate reference. The term ranges from one week to two years 
(sometimes more). At maturity, the two parties agree to exchange the difference between 
the interest accrued at the agreed fixed rate and interest accrued through geometric 
averaging of the floating index rate on the agreed notional amount. This means that the 
floating rate calculation replicates the accrual on an amount (principal plus interest) 
rolled at the index rate every business day over the term of the swap. If cash can be 
borrowed by the swap receiver on the same maturity as the swap and at the same rate and 
lent back every day in the market at the index rate, the cash payoff at maturity will 
exactly match the swap payout: the OIS acts as a perfect hedge for a cash instrument. 
Since indices are generally constructed on the basis of the average of actual transactions, 
the index is generally achievable by borrowers and lenders. Economically, receiving the 
fixed rate in an OIS is like lending cash. Paying the fixed rate in an OIS is like borrowing 
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cash. Settlement occurs net on the earliest practical date. There is no exchange of 
principal. The index rate used is typically the weighted average rate for overnight 
transactions as published by the central bank (e.g., the effective fed funds rate). 
Repo-Haircut Index: The equal-weighted average haircut for all nine of the asset 
classes in Panel D of Table I.  Haircuts of 100% (= no trade) are included in this average. 
(Table I, Panel D) 
Repo-Rate Index: During the time that all asset classes have active repo markets 
in 2007 and early 2008, this index is identical to the equal-weighted average repo rate for 
all nine the asset classes in Panel D of Table I.  As haircuts rise to 100% for any given 
asset class (= no trade) on date t, we drop that class from the index and compute the index 
change for period t using only the classes that traded in both period t-1 and period t.  
(Table I, Panel D) 
Repurchase Agreements (repo), Reverse Repurchase Agreements (reverse 
repo):  A sale and repurchase agreement, known as a “repo” for short, is a sale of a 
security combined with an agreement to repurchase the same security at a specified price 
at the end of the contract.  Economically, a repo is a secured or collateralized loan, that is, 
a loan of cash against a security as collateral.  From the point of view of the borrower of 
the cash (who is putting up the security as collateral), it is a reverse repurchase 
agreement, or “reverse repo.”   
Residential Mortgage-backed Security (RMBS):  See asset-backed securities, 
above. 
Securitization: The process of financing by segregating specified cash flows, 
from loans originated by a firm (the “sponsor”) and selling claims specifically linked to 
these specified cash flows. This is accomplished by setting up another company, called a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) or special purpose entity, and then selling the specified 
cash flows to this company, which purchases the rights to the cash flows by issuing 
(rated) securities into the capital market.  The sponsor services the cash flows, that is, 
makes sure that the cash flows are arriving, etc. The SPV is not an operating company in 
the usual sense.  It is more of a robot company in that it is a set of rules.  It has no 
employees or physical location. 
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Securitized Banking:  Refers in this paper to the nexus of securitization and 
repurchase markets where “depositors” are able to engage in (reverse) repo by depositing 
money in exchange for securitized bonds as collateral. 
Securitized Bonds: A general term referring to any traded and rated tranche of an 
ABS, RMBS, CMBS, CDO, or CLO. 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV): An SPV or special purpose entity (SPE) is a 
legal entity which has been set up for a specific, limited, purpose by another entity, the 
sponsoring firm. An SPV can take the form of a corporation, trust, partnership, or a 
limited liability company. The SPV may be a subsidiary of the sponsoring firm, or it may 
be an “orphan” SPV, one that is not consolidated with the sponsoring firm for tax, 
accounting, or legal purposes (or may be consolidated for some purposes but not others).  
An SPV can only carry out some specific purpose, or circumscribed activity, or a series 
of such transactions.  An essential feature of an SPV is that it be “bankruptcy remote,” 
that is, that the SPV never be able to become legally bankrupt.  The most straightforward 
way to achieve this would be for the SPV to waive its right to file a voluntary bankruptcy 
petition, but this is legally unenforceable. The only way to completely eliminate the risk 
of either voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy is to create the SPV in a legal form that is 
ineligible to be a debtor under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.   
Structured Finance: A broad term used to describe securitized bonds, but also 
more generally any bond with an embedded derivative. 
Student AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by student loans. (Table I – Panel B) 
Tranche: A tranche (French for “cut”) refers to a slice of an portfolio ordered by 
seniority, e.g., a senior tranche or AAA tranche is more senior than a junior tranche or 
BBB-rated tranche.  
UK Cards AAA: AAA-rated ABS backed by UK credit-card receivables (Table I 
– Panel C) 
UK RMBS AAA: AAA-rated RMBS backed by UK mortgages. (Table I – Panel 
C) 
Unpriced ABS/MBS, All Subprime:  All tranches of ABS, MBS and all 
subprime securitized bonds which do not have public pricing posted on Bloomberg or 
Reuters (two news services used by traders)  (Table I ‐ Panel D) 
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Unpriced CDO/CLO: All tranches of CDO and CLO securitized bonds which do 
not have public pricing posted on Bloomberg or Reuters (two news services used by 
traders)  (Table I ‐ Panel D) 
VIX:  VIX is the ticker symbol for a measure of implied volatility from S&P 500 index options. A high value of the VIX is associated with a more violatile market and more costly options.  The VIX is calculated and traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange.  (Table I – Panel E) 
 
 
Appendix B: The Spread Data 
Spreads are not a common variable of analysis for financial economists, who 
prefer to focus on returns. As a practical matter, however, interest rate risk is frequently 
hedged, leaving credit risk as the focus.  Credit spreads isolate the risk of default and the 
recovery rate. Thus, when assessing fixed income securities, investors focus on spreads 
as a common measure for determining how much they are being paid to bear the credit 
risk embedded in a security. 
For fixed rate instruments, the spread is the yield spread, i.e., the difference 
between the yield-to-maturity of the credit risky instrument and the benchmark 
instrument (LIBOR) with the same maturity. Floating rate instrument prices are 
converted to a spreads by determining the discount margin, which is the fixed amount to 
be added to the current LIBOR rate that is required to reprice the bond to par.  The 
discount margin measures the yield relative to the current LIBOR rate and so does not 
take into account the term structure of interest rates. 
The discount margin, dm, satisfies the following relationship: 
  
where:  
 
P = Price of the floating rate note (FRN) per $100 face value; 
 
qm = Quoted margin on FRN; 
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dm = discount margin; 
 
yi = Assumed value of the reference rate (LIBOR) in period i; 
 
n = number of period until maturity; 
 
m= number of period per year. 
 
The formula shows that if the quoted margin is equal to the discount margin, then 
the second term is zero and the FRN is valued at par.  If the current price of the floater 
differs from par, then the discount margin is nonzero.  The discount margin assumes that 
the cash flows over the remaining life of the bond are determined by the current reference 
rate value.  The margin is selected so that the present value of the cash flows is equal to 
the security’s price.  The discount margin is a measure which is similar to yield-to-
maturity for fixed rate instruments.  It expresses the price of an FRN relative to the 
current LIBOR level.  See Fabozzi and Mann (2000). 
 
 
 
 

Figure 4: The Repo-Haircut Index  
Notes: The repo-haircut index is the equally-weighted average haircut for all nine asset classes 
included in Table I, Panel D. 
Figure 5: Issuance in U.S. Capital Markets ($ billions) 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Agencies, Thomson Financial, Inside MBS & 
ABS, Bloomberg. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7 
 
Source: Federal Flow of Funds. 
  
FIGURE 8: ABX vs. LIB-OIS 
 
Notes:  ABX is the 2006-1 BBB tranche.  LIB-OIS spreads on left-hand Y-axis, ABX spreads on 
right-hand y-axis.  Both scales are in basis points. 
 
Figure 9: LIB-OIS and Non-Subprime-Related Asset Classes 
 
 
  
Notes:  LIB-OIS is shown with the spreads on AAA-rated asset-backed securities: student loans, 
credit cards, and auto loans. The scale is in basis points. 
Table I  
Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the state variable, credit spreads, repo spreads and control variables 
used in this paper. For each series we show summary statistics for the whole period and four subperiods. Panel A 
shows statistics for the state variable LIB-OIS and the credit spreads of three categories of subprime related assets. 
Panel B and Panel C shows statistics for the credit spreads of U.S. and non-U.S. non-subprime asset classes. Panel D 
reports the statistics for the spreads between three-month repo rates and OIS. Panel E shows statistics for the five 
control variables used in the regression analysis. All variables given in this Table are defined in Appendix A.   All 
spreads are measured in basis points, with spread computations explained in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: State Variable and Subprime Related Assets Class 
Series Periods Mean Median Std. Err. Max Min 
State Variable 
Whole period 72.43 66.44 67.57 354.20 7.45 
First half of 2007 7.97 7.88 0.42 9.15 7.45 
Second half of 2007 58.71 60.78 28.64 104.73 7.70 
All of 2007 33.34 8.50 32.53 104.73 7.45 
LIB-OIS Spread 
All of 2008 108.10 77.20 71.61 354.20 24.33 
Credit Spreads  of Sub-prime Related Assets 
Whole period 714.25 425.00 545.26 1800.00 170.00 
First half of 2007 273.27 250.00 93.54 425.00 170.00 
Second half of 2007 1113.46 1000.00 441.03 1800.00 350.00 
HEL BBB 
All of 2007 693.37 425.00 528.75 1800.00 170.00 
Whole period 2861.93 2969.42 2023.57 8421.76 365.00 
First half of 2007 627.50 650.00 152.50 950.00 365.00 
Second half of 2007 2178.47 1940.75 659.41 3063.16 1100.00 
All of 2007 1402.99 1025.00 915.27 3063.16 365.00 
Mezzanine CDO BBB 
All of 2008 4858.38 4687.97 1268.88 8421.76 3016.83 
Whole Period 121.60 18.00 157.64 500.00 14.00 
First half of 2007 15.35 15.00 1.23 18.00 14.00 
Second half of 2007 213.31 195.00 159.59 500.00 15.00 
HELOC AAA 
All of 2007 114.33 18.00 149.92 500.00 14.00 
CDS Spreads of Subprime Mortgage Lenders 
Whole period 275.86 220.02 253.96 1185.84 22.52 
First half of 2007 51.10 50.79 17.64 77.57 22.52 
Second half of 2007 445.43 282.34 338.99 1088.00 62.53 
All of 2007 248.26 71.09 310.03 1088.00 22.52 
Countrywide 
All of 2008 301.04 260.00 188.39 1185.84 95.67 
Whole period 413.57 318.33 643.09 4352.43 19.61 
First half of 2007 35.39 33.68 11.11 57.38 19.61 
Second half of 2007 189.27 122.03 133.36 438.47 42.55 
All of 2007 112.33 50.32 121.71 438.47 19.61 
WAMU 
All of 2008 815.23 438.90 818.44 4352.43 255.00 
CDS Spreads of Monoline Insurers 
Whole period 911.33 391.88 1116.88 4153.55 13.46 
First half of 2007 24.20 22.66 9.34 42.20 13.46 
Second half of 2007 164.92 121.69 89.44 322.96 45.18 
All of 2007 94.56 43.69 94.93 322.96 13.46 
MBIA 
All of 2008 1656.46 1391.26 1101.33 4153.55 372.55 
Whole period 520.96 453.46 406.35 1411.73 27.48 
First half of 2007 51.42 52.40 17.82 81.32 27.48 
Second half of 2007 270.97 245.95 138.90 528.53 71.21 
All of 2007 161.20 79.09 147.99 528.53 27.48 
MGIC 
All of 2008 849.17 885.61 262.06 1411.73 320.00 
Whole period 1072.85 809.83 956.80 3164.27 28.53 
First half of 2007 56.54 55.49 18.12 93.39 28.53 
Second half of 2007 536.20 559.22 261.37 1000.32 73.26 
All of 2007 296.37 86.62 303.80 1000.32 28.53 
Radian 
All of 2008 1781.22 1938.22 781.58 3164.27 704.70 
       
Panel B:U.S. Non-Subprime Asset Classes 
Series Periods Mean Median Std. Err. Max Min 
Whole period 109.42 55.00 153.65 500.00 -1.00 
First half of 2007 -1.00 -1.00 0.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Second half of 2007 23.38 20.00 16.11 50.00 -1.00 
All of 2007 11.19 -1.00 16.70 50.00 -1.00 
Auto AAA 
All of 2008 199.04 110.00 167.75 500.00 50.00 
Whole period 101.92 55.00 148.93 550.00 -4.00 
First half of 2007 -3.31 -3.00 0.47 -3.00 -4.00 
Second half of 2007 24.88 23.00 17.73 55.00 -3.00 
All of 2007 10.79 -3.00 18.89 55.00 -4.00 
Cards AAA 
All of 2008 185.05 100.00 166.45 550.00 50.00 
Whole period 65.11 30.00 90.47 325.00 -3.00 
First half of 2007 -1.12 -1.00 1.18 0.00 -3.00 
Second half of 2007 17.92 18.00 10.28 35.00 0.00 
All of 2007 8.40 0.00 12.03 35.00 -3.00 
Student AAA 
All of 2008 116.84 65.00 99.71 325.00 25.00 
Whole period 241.16 123.00 313.92 1350.00 22.00 
First half of 2007 26.27 26.50 2.79 31.00 22.00 
Second half of 2007 65.88 62.00 21.83 105.00 31.50 
All of 2007 46.08 31.25 25.25 105.00 22.00 
CMBS AAA 
All of 2008 419.12 250.00 349.14 1350.00 83.00 
Whole period 482.24 428.32 424.87 1463.10 23.00 
First half of 2007 23.73 23.00 2.68 35.00 23.00 
Second half of 2007 177.88 108.09 135.50 450.90 42.00 
All of 2007 100.81 38.50 122.72 450.90 23.00 
HG SF CDO AAA 
All of 2008 830.22 849.77 275.79 1463.10 391.43 
Whole period 1094.17 1084.79 873.46 2712.79 32.00 
First half of 2007 54.38 55.00 20.99 105.00 32.00 
Second half of 2007 567.96 444.69 380.54 1084.79 115.00 
All of 2007 311.17 110.00 372.07 1084.79 32.00 
Mezzanine SF CDO AAA 
All of 2008 1808.49 1742.65 506.59 2712.79 1006.25 
Panel C: Non-US Non-Subprime Asset Classes 
Whole period 145.60 90.00 151.22 650.00 5.00 
First half of 2007 6.23 7.00 0.91 7.00 5.00 
Second half of 2007 48.15 50.00 24.66 90.00 5.00 
All of 2007 27.19 7.00 27.32 90.00 5.00 
Australia RMBS AAA 
All of 2008 257.55 200.00 133.86 650.00 90.00 
Whole period 124.53 80.00 131.25 440.00 4.00 
First half of 2007 4.96 5.00 0.72 6.00 4.00 
Second half of 2007 45.15 50.00 22.23 80.00 5.00 
All of 2007 25.06 6.00 25.58 80.00 4.00 
UK RMBS AAA 
All of 2008 218.58 180.00 121.08 440.00 80.00 
Whole Period 56.56 50.00 42.40 170.00 10.00 
First half of 2007 10.69 11.00 0.74 12.00 10.00 
Second half of 2007 40.35 39.00 18.96 70.00 11.00 
All of 2007 25.52 12.00 20.02 70.00 10.00 
Dutch RMBS AAA 
All of 2008 97.95 90.00 25.38 170.00 60.00 
Whole period 178.62 150.00 176.97 625.00 10.00 
First half of 2007 10.08 10.00 0.28 11.00 10.00 
Second half of 2007 44.38 40.00 25.94 90.00 11.00 
All of 2007 32.95 27.00 26.67 90.00 10.00 
UK Cards AAA 
All of 2008 281.91 215.00 165.05 625.00 90.00 
Whole period 206.25 200.00 176.36 600.00 15.00 
First half of 2007 15.29 15.00 0.76 17.00 15.00 
Second half of 2007 54.92 55.00 25.05 95.00 18.00 
All of 2007 46.52 50.00 27.59 95.00 15.00 
European Consumer Receivable  
AAA 
All of 2008 302.09 235.00 157.19 600.00 95.00 
Whole period 120.57 85.00 119.56 450.00 7.00 
First half of 2007 7.14 7.00 0.38 8.00 7.00 
Second half of 2007 37.31 35.00 18.62 65.00 8.00 
All of 2007 30.91 30.00 20.68 65.00 7.00 
European Auto AAA 
All of 2008 174.36 115.00 122.14 450.00 60.00 
Panel D: Repo Rate Spreads (bps; except repo haircuts) 
Series Periods Mean Median Std. Err. Max Min 
Mean of 
Haircut 
Whole period 86.50 82.14 83.15 429.43 0.50 0.5% 
First half of 2007 2.01 1.95 0.61 5.30 0.50 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 61.85 65.49 36.29 126.35 1.70 0.0% 
All of 2007 32.28 2.70 39.53 126.35 0.50 0.0% 
BBB+ / A Corporates 
All of 2008 136.19 103.63 81.61 429.43 44.33 0.9% 
Whole period 77.59 74.78 78.42 409.43 -3.50 0.5% 
First half of 2007 -1.69 -2.05 1.90 10.44 -3.50 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 55.27 58.95 34.53 116.35 -2.30 0.0% 
All of 2007 27.13 -1.35 37.64 116.35 -3.50 0.0% 
AA-AAA Corporates 
All of 2008 123.86 92.11 77.57 409.43 39.33 0.9% 
Whole period 105.22 94.76 101.00 479.43 1.70 5.2% 
First half of 2007 4.44 4.00 1.77 11.00 1.70 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 68.44 71.78 40.93 141.35 3.70 0.9% 
All of 2007 36.82 5.25 43.29 141.35 1.70 0.5% 
A-AAA ABS-Auto / CC 
/ SL  
All of 2008 167.92 119.81 98.07 479.43 54.33 9.5% 
Whole period 124.04 107.78 120.11 520.30 3.70 9.4% 
First half of 2007 6.41 6.00 1.76 13.00 3.70 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 76.35 81.78 43.92 151.35 5.70 1.8% 
All of 2007 41.80 7.00 46.92 151.35 3.70 0.9% 
AA-AAA ABS-RMBS / 
CMBS 
All of 2008 199.44 145.08 117.27 520.30 64.33 17.1% 
Whole period 135.90 117.78 129.02 550.30 6.70 10.6% 
First half of 2007 9.41 9.00 1.76 16.00 6.70 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 84.55 88.20 48.62 166.35 8.70 3.7% 
All of 2007 47.43 10.00 51.08 166.35 6.70 1.9% 
<AA  ABS-RMBS / 
CMBS 
All of 2008 217.01 153.95 125.56 550.30 69.33 18.6% 
Whole period 108.94 109.69 84.64 295.38 7.70 37.3% 
First half of 2007 10.41 10.00 1.76 17.00 7.70 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 95.62 97.83 58.54 196.35 9.70 7.7% 
All of 2007 53.52 11.00 59.59 196.35 7.70 3.9% 
Unpriced ABS / MBS / 
All Sub-Prime 
All of 2008 187.28 197.88 42.23 295.38 99.33 68.0% 
Whole period 134.46 117.14 127.18 545.30 3.70 10.2% 
First half of 2007 6.41 6.00 1.76 13.00 3.70 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 85.93 92.65 51.27 171.35 5.70 1.8% 
All of 2007 46.64 7.00 53.98 171.35 3.70 0.9% 
AA-AAA CLO 
All of 2008 214.96 148.76 121.61 545.30 79.33 18.7% 
Whole period 130.09 124.69 107.46 380.38 4.70 30.0% 
First half of 2007 7.41 7.00 1.76 14.00 4.70 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 107.77 109.35 69.56 226.35 6.70 8.3% 
All of 2007 58.19 8.00 70.48 226.35 4.70 4.3% 
AA-AAA CDO 
All of 2008 231.72 241.39 56.52 380.38 129.33 53.5% 
Whole period 148.32 142.60 123.54 413.75 6.70 32.4% 
First half of 2007 9.41 9.00 1.76 16.00 6.70 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 122.63 124.42 80.14 256.35 8.70 10.5% 
All of 2007 66.69 10.00 80.34 256.35 6.70 5.4% 
Unpriced CLO / CDO 
All of 2008 268.39 256.58 63.03 413.75 154.33 57.3% 
Whole period 151.36 130.89 152.79 688.10 3.81 15.1% 
First half of 2007 6.03 5.67 1.45 11.33 3.81 0.0% 
Second half of 2007 84.27 89.18 51.14 172.46 5.37 3.9% 
All of 2007 45.61 6.98 53.44 172.46 3.81 2.0% 
Repo-Rate Index and 
Repo-Haircut Index (last 
column) 
All of 2008 248.29 171.20 149.95 688.10 81.55 27.2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel E: Control variables 
Series Periods Mean Median Std. Err. Max Min 
Whole period 4090.11 3604.00 3524.76 10940.98 121.00 
First half of 2007 302.15 329.50 139.54 552.00 121.00 
Second half of 2007 1657.69 1752.00 894.91 3286.00 368.00 
All of 2007 979.92 481.50 933.01 3286.00 121.00 
ABX Index (bps) 
All of 2008 6927.48 6938.67 2447.64 10940.98 3373.00 
Whole period 4.07% 4.04% 0.71% 5.19% 2.08% 
First half of 2007 4.77% 4.73% 0.20% 5.19% 4.51% 
Second half of 2007 4.52% 4.51% 0.32% 5.14% 3.96% 
All of 2007 4.64% 4.66% 0.29% 5.19% 3.96% 
10Year Treasury Rate 
All of 2008 3.56% 3.72% 0.56% 4.50% 2.08% 
Whole period 3.26% 3.53% 1.79% 5.29% 0.18% 
First half of 2007 5.28% 5.28% 0.01% 5.29% 5.26% 
Second half of 2007 4.65% 4.60% 0.42% 5.28% 4.07% 
All of 2007 4.96% 5.27% 0.43% 5.29% 4.07% 
OIS 
All of 2008 1.70% 2.00% 0.94% 3.96% 0.18% 
Whole period -0.40% 0.20% 3.83% 17.97% -18.34% 
First half of 2007 0.25% 0.18% 1.45% 3.04% -3.65% 
Second half of 2007 -0.06% 0.01% 2.02% 3.74% -4.53% 
All of 2007 0.09% 0.18% 1.75% 3.74% -4.53% 
Return of S&P 500 
All of 2008 -0.85% 0.22% 4.98% 17.97% -18.34% 
Whole period 25.94 22.49 14.93 80.86 10.18 
First half of 2007 13.05 13.07 1.97 17.06 10.18 
Second half of 2007 21.88 21.2 4.02 30.83 15.23 
All of 2007 17.47 15.68 5.45 30.83 10.18 
VIX 
All of 2008 33.68 25.59 16.59 80.86 16.3 
Whole period 1.01% 1.22% 0.78% 2.62% -0.13% 
First half of 2007 -0.02% -0.04% 0.09% 0.22% -0.13% 
Second half of 2007 0.59% 0.55% 0.31% 1.39% 0.17% 
All of 2007 0.29% 0.18% 0.38% 1.39% -0.13% 
Slope of Yield Curve 
All of 2008 1.66% 1.57% 0.34% 2.62% 1.08% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II 
Credit Spreads Regression Results 
For each bond i, we estimate equation (2) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009, ∆LIB-OIS is 
the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS). ∆ABX is 
the parentage change of the ABX index at period t. ∆OIS is the Overnight Index Swap. ∆r-10 is the change in yield 
on the 10-year Treasury, with its square given by (∆r-10)^2.  ∆Slope is the change in 10-year minus 2-year Treasury 
yields. ∆VIX is the change in implied volatility of S&P 500, and ∆S&P is the return on S&P 500. t-statistics are 
given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The last two rows report F-statistics and p-values for the key 
state variables. The null hypothesis of the LIB-OIS F-Test is that the sum of all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS and its 
lags is zero. The null hypothesis of the ABX F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of ∆ABX and its lags is zero. Panel 
A shows the results of six U.S. non-subprime assets and Panel B shows the results of six non-US non-subprime 
assets. 
 
Panel A: U.S. Non-Subprime Asset Classes  
  Credit Spreads  
  Cards Auto  Student CMBS 
HG SF 
CDO 
Mezz SF 
CDO 
Intercept 0.003 0.016 -0.010 0.036 0.042 0.052 
 (0.1) (0.33) (-0.33) (2.41) (2.86) (3.96) 
∆LIB-OIS 0.341 0.079 0.461 0.025 -0.051 -0.037 
 (3.24) (0.54) (5.23) (0.26) (-1.16) (-0.94) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-1 0.264 0.486 0.131 0.078 -0.042 0.055 
 (2.64) (3.55) (1.59) (0.84) (-1.00) (1.45) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-2 0.132 0.012 0.138 -0.082 0.038 -0.081 
 (1.32) (0.08) (1.67) (-0.92) (0.91) (-2.15) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-3 0.027 0.170 -0.013 -0.030 -0.030 -0.004 
 (0.27) (1.25) (-0.16) (-0.33) (-0.72) (-0.1) 
∆ABX -0.141 -0.331 0.455 0.012 0.001 0.070 
 (-0.66) (-1.13) (2.32) (0.27) (0.00) (0.86) 
∆ABX, t-1 0.079 -0.025 0.119 -0.013 0.016 0.061 
 (0.36) (-0.09) (0.6) (-0.32) (0.18) (0.74) 
∆ABX, t-2 0.315 0.250 -0.202 -0.072 -0.020 -0.040 
 (1.48) (0.86) (-1.06) (-1.71) (-0.23) (-0.5) 
∆ABX, t-3 -0.277 -0.351 -0.150 -0.052 0.049 -0.011 
 (-1.3) (-1.2) (-0.69) (-1.24) (0.54) (-0.14) 
∆OIS -0.253 -0.147 -0.358 -0.096 0.156 0.106 
 (-0.78) (-0.33) (-1.34) (-0.69) (1.14) (0.85) 
∆r-10 0.111 -0.092 0.059 -0.214 -0.227 -0.132 
 (0.58) (-0.36) (0.36) (-2.65) (-2.87) (-1.85) 
(∆r-10)^2 0.174 0.076 0.037 -0.042 -0.094 -0.144 
 (0.57) (0.18) (0.14) (-0.33) (-0.75) (-1.26) 
∆S&P -0.443 1.518 -0.757 -1.622 -0.580 0.592 
 (-0.29) (0.7) (-0.57) (-2.42) (-0.89) (0.99) 
∆VIX -0.006 0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.002 0.006 
 (-0.5) (0.23) (-0.29) (0.56) (0.41) (1.26) 
∆Slope -0.155 0.189 -0.039 0.298 0.269 0.075 
 (-0.74) (0.64) (-0.23) (3.29) (3.02) (0.92) 
20.16 10.26 26.13 2.99 1.38 1.08 LIB-OIS F-test (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.08) (0.24) (0.30) 
0.00 0.73 0.42 0.00 0.08 0.39 ABX F-test (0.95) (0.40) (0.52) (0.95) (0.78) (0.59)  
 
 
  Panel B: Non-US Non-Subprime Asset Classes 
 Credit Spreads  
  
Australia 
RMBS UK RMBS 
Dutch 
RMBS UK Cards 
European 
Consumer 
Receivable 
European 
Auto  
Intercept 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.031 0.032 0.037 
 (0.52) (0.93) (1.14) (2.4) (3.21) (2.35) 
∆LIB-OIS 0.126 0.240 0.100 0.109 0.049 0.081 
 (1.57) (4.38) (2.71) (2.86) (1.76) (1.8) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-1 0.575 0.237 0.071 0.136 0.021 0.019 
 (7.56) (4.57) (2.11) (3.72) (0.8) (0.45) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-2 -0.181 -0.051 0.115 0.019 0.033 0.104 
 (-2.44) (-1.01) (3.42) (0.52) (1.26) (2.51) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-3 0.138 0.067 -0.015 -0.019 0.020 0.022 
 (1.86) (1.32) (-0.47) (-0.55) (0.77) (0.53) 
∆ABX 0.025 0.029 0.095 0.094 0.116 0.095 
 (0.15) (0.26) (1.37) (1.03) (1.65) (0.84) 
∆ABX, t-1 -0.002 0.022 0.002 0.028 0.001 -0.010 
 (-0.02) (0.19) (0.03) (0.34) (0.01) (-0.09) 
∆ABX, t-2 -0.171 -0.018 -0.037 0.011 0.037 0.044 
 (-1.09) (-0.17) (-0.54) (0.13) (0.54) (0.4) 
∆ABX, t-3 0.173 0.072 -0.109 -0.084 -0.060 -0.265 
 (1.09) (0.66) (-1.6) (-1.05) (-0.9) (-2.47) 
∆OIS 0.034 -0.031 -0.237 -0.051 -0.054 -0.164 
 (0.1) (-0.15) (-0.63) (-0.33) (-0.48) (-0.91) 
∆r-10 -0.207 -0.140 -0.067 -0.134 -0.106 -0.146 
 (-1.36) (-1.34) (-0.81) (-1.84) (-1.97) (-1.71) 
(∆r-10)^2 0.194 -0.022 -0.058 -0.036 -0.096 -0.018 
 (0.85) (-0.15) (-0.5) (-0.34) (-1.23) (-0.15) 
∆S&P -0.915 -0.272 -0.709 0.164 0.194 0.695 
 (-0.76) (-0.33) (-0.86) (0.28) (0.45) (1.01) 
∆VIX -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 
 (-0.64) (-0.11) (-0.31) (0.07) (0.39) (0.6) 
∆Slope 0.179 0.077 0.051 0.133 0.091 0.190 
 (1.05) (0.66) (0.51) (1.64) (1.53) (2) 
LIB-OIS  25.57 30.71 20.89 14.40 6.56 8.62 
F-test (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) 
ABX   0.01 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.51 0.41 
F-test (0.93) (0.60) (0.71) (0.77) (0.48) (0.52) 
 
Table III 
Summary of F-Test Results for Different Asset Categories 
For each bond i, we estimate equation (2) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009, ∆LIB-OIS is 
the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS). This table 
summarizes the F-test results for the LIB-OIS state variable and its lags. The null hypothesis of F-test is the sum of 
all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS and its lags is zero. The numbers in the table indicate how many F-tests of bonds in each 
category are significant at various confidence levels. Asset categories are listed in Panel A of Table I. “Negative” 
and “Positive” indicate the sign of the sum of coefficients for ∆LIB-OIS and its lags.    
Panel A: Whole Period: January 4, 2007 to January 29,2009 
    Negative Positive 
Categories Total Number 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
Subprime 63 1 1 0 2 1 2 
Nonsubprime_US 176 3 0 0 4 7 106 
Nonsubprime_Europe 59 0 0 0 0 6 39 
Financial 46 0 0 0 3 2 6 
Industrial 48 0 0 0 5 14 9 
Total 392 4 1 0 14 30 162 
Panel B: Subperiod I: January 4, 2007 to December 27,2007 
    Negative Positive 
Categories Total Number 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
Subprime 63 2 4 2 0 2 1 
Nonsubprime_US 176 4 0 1 8 21 75 
Nonsubprime_Europe 59 0 0 0 5 10 24 
Financial 46 3 1 0 1 2 1 
Industrial 48 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Total 392 9 5 3 14 36 105 
Panel C: Subperiod II: January 3, 2008 to January 29,2009 
    Negative Positive 
Categories Total Number 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
Subprime 63 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nonsubprime_US 176 8 0 0 23 26 41 
Nonsubprime_Europe 59 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Financial 46 0 0 0 6 10 6 
Industrial 48 0 0 0 6 9 21 
Total 392 9 0 0 35 46 68 
 
  
Table IV 
Summary of F-Test Results for Different Rating Classes 
For each bond i, we estimate equation (2) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 2009, ∆LIB-OIS is 
the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS).This table 
summarizes the F-test results for the LIB-OIS state variable and its lags. The null hypothesis of F-test is the sum of 
all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS and its lags is zero. The numbers in the table indicate how many F-tests of bonds in each 
rating class are significant at various confidence levels. “Negative” and “Positive” indicate the sign of the sum of the 
coefficients for ∆LIB-OIS and its lags.    
Panel A: Whole Period: January 4, 2007 to January 29,2009 
    Negative Positive 
Rating Total Number 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
AAA 157 4 0 0 4 10 83 
AA 47 0 1 0 1 3 9 
A 74 0 0 0 3 5 33 
BBB 83 0 0 0 2 6 36 
Other 31 0 0 0 4 6 1 
Total 392 4 1 0 14 30 162 
Panel B: Subperiod I: January 4, 2007 to December 27,2007 
    Negative Positive 
Rating Total Number 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
AAA 157 5 1 1 9 25 47 
AA 47 0 0 1 0 1 7 
A 74 0 2 0 3 4 27 
BBB 83 1 1 0 1 5 23 
Other 31 3 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 392 9 5 3 14 36 105 
Panel C: Subperiod II: January 3, 2008 to January 29,2009 
    Negative Positive 
Rating Total Number 10% 5% 1% 10% 5% 1% 
AAA 157 0 0 0 4 13 44 
AA 47 1 0 0 3 12 4 
A 74 4 0 0 14 9 5 
BBB 83 4 0 0 9 11 5 
Other 31 0 0 0 5 1 10 
Total 392 9 0 0 35 46 68 
 
Table V  
Repo Spreads Regression Results 
For each class of securitized bonds, we estimate equation (3) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 
2009. ∆LIB-OIS is the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap 
(OIS). ∆ABX is the parentage change of the ABX index at period t. ∆OIS is the Overnight Index Swap. ∆r-10 is the 
change in yield on the 10-year Treasury, with its square given by (∆r-10)^2.  ∆Slope is the change in 10-year minus 
2-year Treasury yields. ∆VIX is the change in implied volatility of S&P 500, and ∆S&P is the return on S&P 500. t-
statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The last two rows report F-statistics and p-values 
for the key state variables. The null hypothesis of the LIB-OIS F-Test is that the sum of all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS 
and its lags is zero. The null hypothesis of the ABX F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of ∆ABX and its lags is 
zero. The null hypothesis of the VOL F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of VOL and its lags is zero. 
  Repo Rate Spreads 
  
A-AAA ABS-
Auto / CC / SL 
<AA  ABS-
RMBS / CMBS 
AA-AAA ABS-
RMBS / CMBS AA-AAA CLO  AA-AAA CDO 
Intercept 0.035 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.024 
 (0.86) (0.89) (0.71) (0.71) (0.93) 
∆LIB-OIS 1.321 0.825 1.043 1.025 0.558 
 (12) (17.26) (16.45) (15.66) (7.26) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-1 -0.168 -0.004 -0.056 -0.068 0.044 
 (-1.58) (-0.1) (-0.93) (-1.08) (0.67) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-2 0.084 0.071 0.099 0.115 0.062 
 (0.8) (1.57) (1.65) (1.85) (0.85) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-3 -0.134 0.004 -0.040 -0.021 0.010 
 (-1.27) (0.09) (-0.66) (-0.35) (0.15) 
∆ABX -0.188 -0.152 -0.169 -0.183 -0.031 
 (-0.86) (-1.59) (-1.32) (-1.4) (-0.23) 
∆ABX, t-1 0.227 0.020 0.072 0.076 0.206 
 (1.03) (0.21) (0.57) (0.58) (1.5) 
∆ABX, t-2 0.435 0.007 0.092 0.086 0.037 
 (1.99) (0.07) (0.73) (0.66) (0.28) 
∆ABX, t-3 0.018 0.064 0.057 0.085 0.052 
  (0.08) (0.67) (0.44) (0.66) (0.38) 
∆VOL -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.32) (0.15) (0.42) (0.25) (0.25) 
∆VOL, t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.03) (-0.35) (-0.73) (-0.6) (-0.84) 
∆VOL, t-2 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.32) (0.76) (0.98) (0.45) (0.26) 
∆VOL, t-3 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.18) (-0.78) (-1.19) (-1.3) (0.8) 
∆OIS 0.060 -0.044 -0.078 -0.005 0.184 
 (0.11) (-0.19) (-0.21) (-0.01) (0.21) 
∆r-10 0.085 0.023 0.085 0.028 0.142 
 (0.4) (0.27) (0.73) (0.23) (0.79) 
(∆r-10)^2 -0.178 -0.019 0.010 0.019 -0.082 
 (-0.52) (-0.13) (0.05) (0.09) (-0.35) 
∆S&P -0.374 0.136 -0.158 0.430 -2.373 
 (-0.21) (0.17) (-0.15) (0.39) (-1.38) 
∆VIX 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000 
 (0.29) (-0.01) (0.09) (0.64) (-0.01) 
∆Slope -0.218 -0.080 -0.122 -0.027 -0.196 
 (-0.98) (-0.81) (-0.92) (-0.2) (-0.99) 
32.56 129.61 100.87 96.07 30.37 LIB-OIS F-Test 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
1.44 0.12 0.05 0.07 1.07 ABX F-Test (0.23) (0.73) (0.82) (0.79) (0.3) 
0.53 0.01 0.34 1.80 0.14 VOL F-Test (0.47) (0.93) (0.56) (0.18) (0.71) 
Table VI   
Haircut Regression Results  
For each class of securitized bonds, we estimate equation (7) using weekly data from January 4, 2007 to January 29, 
2009, ∆LIB-OIS is the percentage change of the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Overnight Index Swap 
(OIS). ∆ABX is the parentage change of the ABX index at period t. ∆OIS is the Overnight Index Swap. ∆r-10 is the 
change in yield on the 10-year Treasury, with its square given by (∆r-10)^2.  ∆Slope is the change in 10-year minus 
2-year Treasury yields. ∆VIX is the change in implied volatility of S&P 500, and ∆S&P is the return on S&P 500. t-
statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The last two rows report F-statistics and p-values 
for the key state variables. The null hypothesis of the LIB-OIS F-Test is that the sum of all coefficients of ∆LIB-OIS 
and its lags is zero. The null hypothesis of the ABX F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of ∆ABX and its lags is 
zero. The null hypothesis of the VOL F-Test is the sum of all coefficients of VOL and its lags is zero. 
Panel A: Haircut Regression with Lags 
  Change of Haircuts 
  
A-AAA ABS-
Auto / CC / SL 
<AA  ABS-
RMBS / CMBS 
AA-AAA ABS-
RMBS / CMBS AA-AAA CDO AA-AAA CLO 
Intercept 0.00096 0.00266 0.00194 -0.00514 0.00311 
 (0.69) (1.19) (1.08) (-0.34) (1.59) 
∆LIB-OIS -0.00010 0.00009 0.00010 0.00121 0.00003 
 (-1.44) (0.89) (1.25) (0.85) (0.27) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-1 -0.00010 0.00001 -0.00002 0.00079 0.00008 
 (-1.53) (0.07) (-0.24) (0.55) (0.67) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-2 0.00005 0.00008 0.00011 -0.00053 -0.00016 
 (0.75) (0.75) (1.31) (-0.41) (-1.45) 
∆LIB-OIS, t-3 -0.00001 -0.00014 -0.00010 0.00073 0.00006 
 (-0.12) (-1.2) (-1.18) (0.62) (0.74) 
∆ABX 0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 0.00004 0.00000 
 (1.05) (0.33) (1.19) (0.69) (-0.34) 
∆ABX, t-1 0.00000 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 
 (0.06) (-1.05) (-0.64) (0.2) (0.18) 
∆ABX, t-2 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00000 
 (0.12) (0.67) (0.86) (0.32) (0.43) 
∆ABX, t-3 0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00003 -0.00001 
  (-0.79) (-1.4) (-1.58) (0.44) (-1.34) 
∆VOL 0.00036 0.00001 0.00000 0.00311 0.00015 
 (2.31) (0.52) (-0.06) (3.19) (2.05) 
∆VOL, t-1 -0.00049 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00345 0.00000 
 (-2.01) (-0.24) (-0.12) (-2.37) (0.04) 
∆VOL, t-2 0.00049 0.00002 0.00003 0.00235 -0.00016 
 (2.09) (0.36) (0.34) (1.57) (-1.61) 
∆VOL, t-3 -0.00005 -0.00001 -0.00004 0.00006 0.00017 
 (-0.28) (-0.52) (-0.69) (0.05) (1.99) 
∆OIS 0.00476 -0.01801 -0.01655 -0.09061 -0.01967 
 (0.4) (-0.92) (-1.02) (-0.67) (-1.2) 
∆r-10 0.00413 -0.01072 -0.00689 0.04610 0.00241 
 (0.6) (-1.02) (-0.82) (0.51) (0.26) 
(∆r-10)^2 0.00703 -0.00617 -0.00882 -0.13209 -0.00100 
 (0.64) (-0.36) (-0.62) (-0.97) (-0.06) 
∆S&P 0.03663 -0.02488 -0.06200 0.07360 -0.00699 
 (0.66) (-0.28) (-0.89) (0.09) (-0.09) 
∆VIX 0.00037 -0.00014 -0.00042 0.00098 -0.00074 
 (0.77) (-0.18) (-0.68) (0.14) (-1.07) 
∆Slope 0.01253 0.01069 0.00682 -0.07066 -0.00906 
 (1.63) (0.85) (0.67) (-0.7) (-0.85) 
1.47 0.06 0.69 0.89 0.01 LIB-OIS F-Test 
(0.23) (0.81) (0.41) (0.35) (0.91) 
0.05 0.58 0.01 0.64 0.32 ABX F-Test 
(0.83) (0.45) (0.92) (0.43) (0.57) 
4.66 0.07 0.29 5.33 5.53 VOL F-Test 
(0.03) (0.80) (0.60) (0.02) (0.02) 
